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1 Introduction
As is well known, the difficulty of measuring individual performance objec-
tively limits the use of legally enforceable incentive contracts and means that
firms often rely on informal agreements to motivate employees.1 Consider-
able attention has been devoted to two alternative incentive schemes, namely,
efficiency wages and discretionary bonuses, which have been largely studied
and compared by the literature (see, in particular, Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984;
MacLeod and Malcomson 1989, 1998).2
This paper is aimed at extending the previous literature on informal in-
centive labour contracts by introducing the role of imperfect (Cournot) com-
petition in the product market. While previous works have concentrated on
the labour market and implicitly assumed that product markets, where firms
operate, are perfectly competitive, we analyze the dynamic interaction be-
tween product market competition and incentives against shirking. Indeed,
in order to provide parties with incentives to fulfil informal labour contracts,
the degree of competition in the product market can play an important role
in various ways.
The questions addressed here include the following: does competition in
the product market affect wage profiles, and if so, how does this relate to
the incentive scheme adopted by firms? What relationship should we ex-
pect to find between product market competition and industry profits, in
terms of alternative incentive contracts? Since with efficiency wages firms
have to pay a rent to motivate their workers, but do not have to with discre-
tionary bonuses, are profits always higher with bonuses? Or, does the degree
of product market competition affect the relative profitability of alternative
schemes? In addition, while the standard shirking model of efficiency wages
predicts a positive clear-cut relationship between wages and employment,
and it is clear that employment increases with the number of competing
firms, empirical evidence on the connection between wages and product mar-
1Such informal agreements or contracts are also referred to as “self-enforcing implicit
contracts” (e.g. Bull 1987) or “relational contracts” (e.g. Levin 2003).
2As pointed out by MacLeod and Malcomson (1989, p. 448), efficiency wage contracts
also have their own informal or implicit element, namely “that the employee will perform
satisfactorily if employed and that the employer will continue the contract if performance
is satisfactory, or terminate it if not”.
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ket competition is mixed (e.g. Blanchflower 1986; Dickens and Katz 1987;
Nickell et al. 1994, as well as the literature cited therein). Thus, could
introducing product market competition into a shirking model modify its
standard prediction regarding the wage-employment nexus? All these issues
are obviously relevant to the concerns of labour economics and industrial
organization.
We also introduce an important issue with respect to the standard hy-
pothesis regarding the reputation of workers. We will assume that workers
who have been previously fired as the result of shirking may have a lower
probability of finding a new job with respect to other workers and, more
importantly, we relate such a possibility to the number of firms competing in
the product market. As we will discuss, detecting shirkers in the unemploy-
ment pool (i.e. establishing a worker’s reputation) becomes more difficult as
the number of firms in the market increases.3
Our main results can be summarized as follows. Firstly, equilibrium ef-
ficiency wages may be decreasing in the probability of unemployed workers
finding a job, as well as when competition and employment increase. Such
outcomes, which are in contrast with Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), are a re-
sult of the fact that when the number of firms in the market increases, the
probability of workers finding a job becomes larger. In turn, when a worker’s
reputation plays a role, this also increases the “opportunity-cost” of shirking
and enables firms to get workers to perform well even with a lower wage.
When firms adopt discretionary bonuses, on the other hand, workers’
wages are generally uncorrelated with competition in the product market.
However, there is a critical threshold for the number of competing firms above
which discretionary bonuses are no longer sustainable as an equilibrium. This
is because a firm’s profit becomes too low for its promise to pay the bonus
to be credible. This threshold relates to product market as well as labour
market parameters.
The above results also lend themselves to a comparative analysis of the
relationship between the two incentive schemes considered and (industry)
profits. In general, since efficiency wages mean that a firm pays a rent to
motivate their workers, which does not apply to discretionary bonuses, prof-
3The role of workers’ reputation in affecting unverifiable performance is discussed in
Malcomson (1999), however it is not related to the degree of product market competition.
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its are higher with the latter. However, when information about a firm’s
misbehaviour flows at a (relatively) low rate in the labour market, there is
a range of the number of firms, over and above the critical threshold with
bonuses, for which an equilibrium with positive profits does exist only with
efficiency wages.
Our work relates to (and largely draws from) the informal contracts lit-
erature. Most notably, MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) model the choice
between efficiency wages and performance pay as a function of labour mar-
ket conditions. They show that, when there are unemployed workers, at an
efficient equilibrium the rent required to make the agreement self-enforcing
must go to the worker in the form of a high (efficiency) wage while, if there
are unfilled vacancies, efficient market equilibrium has performance pay.4 In
contrast to MacLeod and Malcomson (1998), our aim is to compare efficiency
wages and performance pay in relation to product (instead of labour) market
conditions.
This paper also deals with the literature that, starting from Machlup
(1967), studies how product market competition interacts with incentive con-
tracts in motivating managers and other workers (e.g. Schmidt 1997; Raith
2003; see Legros and Newman 2011 for a recent survey). This literature,
however, differs from our work mainly because it considers principal-agent
problems where formal incentive contracts (linking pay to performance) are
feasible, and analyzes changes in the optimal “shape” of incentive contracts
following changes in product market competition. In contrast, we consider
the interaction between incentive labour contracts and imperfect product
market competition in a context in which formal incentive contracts are not
feasible.5
The relationship between the number of firms competing in the (oligopolis-
4Meccheri (2005) compares efficiency wages, discretionary bonuses and tournaments in
terms of employment outcomes.
5See Cun˜at and Guadalupe (2005) for an empirical study on the relationship between
product market competition and compensation packages. They also recognize that the
evidence regarding the relationship between product market competition and incentive pay
is still very limited, which is particularly true for the case of informal incentive contracts. In
this paper, we will provide some novel theoretical predictions on the relationship between
informal labour contracts and product market competition, which could be suitable for
testing empirically (see, in particular, the discussion in the concluding section).
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tic) product market, wages and (industry) profits has also been examined in
relation to unionized oligopolies (e.g. Dowrick 1989; Naylor 2002; Bastos et
al. 2010; Mukherjee 2012). However, in these studies, the effects of compe-
tition on wages operate by affecting the rents that the unions bargain with
while, within our framework, these effects relate to the changes in the optimal
incentive wage contract.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 the basic
framework is described. The competition game in the product market and
the design of alternative (incentive) labour contracts are examined in Section
3. Section 4 compares their outcomes in relation to the effects on industry
profits. Section 5 draws some conclusions, while further details and technical
proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Economic environment
Time is discrete, t = 1, 2, ...6 There is a number n ≥ 1 of identical firms
competing a` la Cournot repeatedly over time in a homogeneous good market,
with an inverse demand function given by:
p = a− cQ (1)
where Q is the overall market output. There is also a pool of ` identical
workers, with ` > n. Each employment relationship consists of a repeated
game played between a firm and a pool worker who form an employment
relationship over a certain period and interact until their relationship is sev-
ered. Given the substantial turnover of jobs in labour markets (Davis and
Haltiwanger 1999), in each period employment relationships become unprof-
itable at a rate s for exogenous reasons and in such cases, firm and employee
separate. Firms and workers have an infinite life, they are risk-neutral and
discount the future with the same rate r. For simplicity’s sake, we concen-
trate on a situation in which each firm employs one individual worker (e.g. a
6Since in this environment the technology, the preferences and all other variables are
stationary, we do not need to denote variables by a time index.
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manager) and all marginal costs, other than the worker’s wage, are constant
and normalized to zero.
With regard to labour contracts and workers’ effort, we follow MacLeod
and Malcomson (1989, 1998) by assuming that: i) firms perfectly observe
their workers’ decisions regarding effort, but the only legally verifiable pieces
of information that can be included in a labour contract are money payments
and whether or not a person is employed by a firm; and ii) in relation to the
worker employed by firm i, the decision regarding effort consists in each
period of either working (ei = 1) or shirking (ei = 0), thus obtaining an
utility given by:
ui = wi − vei (2)
where wi is the wage paid by firm i and v > 0 is the disutility of work, while
we normalize the utility of the worker when unemployed to zero.7
Obviously, the worker’s decision is essential for production and, in par-
ticular, we assume that:
qi =
{
0 if ei = 0
arg max pii if ei = 1
(3)
where pii is the firm i’s per-period profit. This means that, while a worker’s
decision to work ensures a level of output that maximizes the firm’s profit
(which will be derived below in detail), there is no production for the firm
when the worker shirks.
2.2 Worker’s reputation
We admit the possibility that a worker’s reputation can be established to
some extent and, most importantly, we relate such a possibility to the number
of firms competing in the product market. We hypothesize that, once a
match has occurred, a firm does not hire a worker when it finds out that
7We consider product market-specific skills or other sources of mobility costs for workers
across sectors. This means that “segmented” labour markets exist in relation to different
product markets (e.g. Reich et al. 1973). However, this is not essential for our results.
Alternatively, a workers reservation utility (normalized to zero) can be interpreted as
the utility of self-employment or employment in other industries where formal incentive
contracts are feasible.
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the latter is a shirker, that is, he/she has previously been fired for shirking.
However, we consider that a worker’s previous history is “soft” information
(i.e. information that is not based on hard evidence) which flows into the
market more and more opaquely as the number of competing firms increases.
In order to understand the rationale behind this assumption, consider the
extreme case of a monopoly. Since a worker who has been fired for shirking
could only find another job in this market with the same firm (the monopoly),
the firm will certainly be aware that the worker is a shirker. On the other
hand, if there are many firms in the market, that is, the product market is
extremely competitive, it may be more complex for firms to detect shirkers.
This is in line with the literature stressing the importance of information
regarding a worker’s previous performance being transmitted, essentially by
word-of-mouth, through social networks or informal channels (e.g. Rees 1966;
Granovetter 1974; Montgomery 1991). Indeed, when recruiting new workers,
social networks between firms tend to lead to more efficient hiring outcomes.
At the same time, when firms rely exclusively on their social contacts, they
lose the opportunity to get information from agents outside their own net-
work (Burt 1992; Schram et al. 2010 provide a recent experimental study on
how firms choose between formal and informal recruitment channels). Given
that building up social links is costly, the larger the overall number of firms,
the higher the probability that a firm is not linked to (hence, does not com-
municate with) others in the market. Thus, in these cases, it is more likely for
a shirker to find another job in firms that do not belong to his/her previous
employer’s social network.
In addition, the larger the number of firms in the product market, the
higher the job turnover, that is, the number of workers who, in each period,
lose their jobs for exogenous (not related to shirking) reasons. This could
make it more difficult for firms to identify shirkers among all the workers that
have lost their jobs. In other words, labour turnover obscures the history of
the game in repeated employment relationships (Mukherjee 2010).8
8An anonymous referee correctly argues that, although effort (and output) is not verifi-
able, it may be possible to assess a worker’s effort by learning about his/her firm’s output.
In fact, this argument provides further rationale to our hypothesis regarding the relation-
ship between a worker’s reputation and product market competition. While with few firms
it may be simple to learn about a firm’s output (e.g. by inferring from the overall output
in the market), this becomes impossible when the number of firms is very large.
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2.3 Timing, unemployment values and flows
The timing of events for each period is as follows: i) matching occurs be-
tween an unmatched firm and worker and, unless the firm finds out that the
worker has been previously fired for shirking, an employment relationship is
formed; ii) the firm designs a labour incentive contract that may be either an
efficiency wage-type or bonus-type; iii) the firm makes a production decision
(the product market game) and the worker decides to work or shirk; iv) the
firm pays the (contractual) efficiency wage or, if instead the incentive con-
tract provides for a discretionary bonus, decides whether or not to pay the
bonus; v) finally, separation occurs either for exogenous reasons or because
the firm fires the (shirking) worker.
Starting from a generic period of time and using US and UNS to indi-
cate the expected discounted lifetime utility of an unemployed (unmatched)
worker who has and has not been previously fired for shirking, respectively,
we have (for the sake of brevity, hereafter we omit the index i whenever it is
unnecessary):
Uk =
JmEk
1 + r
+
(1− Jm)Uk
1 + r
⇔ Uk = JmE
k
r + Jm
(4)
where k ∈ {S,NS}, Ek indicates the expected discounted lifetime utility of
an employed worker of type k, m is the per-period probability of an unem-
ployed worker to be matched with a firm and, finally, J is an index function,
such that J = 1 if k = NS and J = θ if k = S.
Specifically, θ represents the probability that, once matched with a firm
(which occurs with probability m), a shirker (i.e. a worker previously fired
for shirking) is not identified as such by the firm. In line with the discus-
sion in Section 2.2 regarding the relationship between a worker’s reputation
and the number of firms in the product market, the following assumption is
established in relation to θ.
Assumption 1 The function θ = θ(n) ∈ [0, 1), with θ(1) = 0 and θ(n)→ 1
for n→∞. Furthermore, for any n, θ(n) is increasing.
According to Assumption 1, when the product market is perfectly com-
petitive (n → ∞), θ → 1 and the Shapiro-Stiglitz “anonymous” market hy-
pothesis applies. Instead, when the product market is a monopoly, a worker
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once fired for shirking is never employed again in this market. Finally, a
“worker’s reputation” can be established to some extent (depending on n)
for intermediate values of n, hence workers previously fired for shirking could
get new jobs with a lower (but positive) probability than other workers.
In a stationary equilibrium, all employed workers do not shirk and lose
their jobs only for exogenous reasons. Furthermore, movements into and out
of unemployment must balance. Accordingly, the matching probability for
an unemployed worker is given by:
m =
sn
`− (1− s)n. (5)
On the other hand, since ` is sufficiently large to satisfy whatever labour
demand and no search frictions are assumed in this economic environment, in
a stationary equilibrium, where all implicit contracts are honoured, each firm
promptly finds a new worker when an employment relationship is severed for
exogenous reasons. Also note that, in this context, it is natural to assume
that firms have all market power vis-a`-vis their workers.
3 Oligopolistic competition and informal in-
centive labour contracts
3.1 The product market game
In accordance with the economic environment described above, per-period
profit for the representative firm i can be written as:
pii = pqi − wi = [a− c(qi +Q−i)]qi − wi (6)
where Q−i is the sum of the quantities supplied by the other firms. Under the
Cournot-Nash assumption, the differentiation of (6) with respect to qi yields
the first-order condition for profit maximization by firm i, from which we can
derive the firm i’s reaction function in the output space: qi = (a− cQ−i)/2c.
Solving all firms’ reaction functions simultaneously enables us to derive the
symmetric equilibrium firm i’s output (with qi = q,∀i), as:
q =
a
(n+ 1)c
. (7)
9
By substituting for (7) in (6), we get an expression for the firm i’s profit
which, in a symmetric equilibrium (pii = pi,∀i), is given by:
pi =
a2
(n+ 1)2c
− w (8)
where w (= wi,∀i) is the outcome of the game determining the optimal
incentive labour contract (which will be studied below). Notice that, due
to the fact that wages are (quasi-)fixed costs in this context, profits can be
negative for large values of n. In what follows, however, we will generally
assume that the product market parameter a is large enough to ensure that
results are meaningful.
3.2 The incentive labour contract and wage profiles
3.2.1 Efficiency wages
The best known model in shirking versions of efficiency wages is provided
by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). By incorporating our hypothesis regarding a
workers probability of getting a job, a standard analysis (see Appendix A.1)
leads to the following equilibrium efficiency wage:
wEW = v
[
(m+ r)(1 + θm+ r)
m+ r − s(θm+ r)
]
. (9)
Lemma 1 With s and r > 0 and for a sufficiently low n, the efficiency wage
decreases when the matching probability m increases.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The rationale behind Lemma 1 is quite straightforward. In our frame-
work, two different factors affect the equilibrium wage when m increases. On
the one hand, by making losing a job less severe for all workers, it forces
firms to pay higher wages to motivate them. This is the standard “Shapiro-
Stiglitz effect”, which is clearly stronger when the role of a worker’s reputa-
tion is weaker (n is higher) and there is not too much difference for workers
between losing a job due to shirking or for exogenous reasons.
On the other hand, however, an increase inm also increases the “opportunity-
cost” of shirking. This is because it increases the differential probability of
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getting another job between non-shirkers and shirkers. This “reputation ef-
fect” operates against the Shapiro-Stiglitz effect, enabling firms to elicit effort
from workers, even with a lower wage. Furthermore, the lower n, the stronger
the role played by the reputation effect. Thus, when m increases and n is
sufficiently low, the reputation effect outweighs the Shapiro-Stiglitz effect,
hence reducing the equilibrium wage.9
In addition, since an increase in the number of firms increases the (steady-
state) matching probability m, it is interesting to investigate whether a nega-
tive relationship could also exist between the equilibrium efficiency wage and
n. Notice that, in our framework, an increase in n also involves a decrease
in unemployment. Thus this negative relationship would imply a reversal in
the standard result that, in equilibrium, efficiency wages and unemployment
are always negatively correlated.
Result 1 When competition is low and the effect of changing competition on
a workers reputation is sufficiently small, a critical n exists below which the
efficiency wage decreases when competition becomes fiercer (i.e. n increases)
and above which the opposite applies. However, the total industry wage bill
(i.e. the sum of firms’ wages) always increases with n.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
While a complete formal proof of Result 1 is provided in the final ap-
pendix, in order to understand the rationale behind it, let us define with
α the term in brackets of (9)’s r.h.s., which represents the key term of the
equilibrium efficiency wage. By differentiating α with respect to n:
∂α
∂n
= θ′(n)
∂α
∂θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
changing θ effect (+)
+
∂m
∂n
∂α
∂m︸ ︷︷ ︸
changing m effect (+/−)
. (10)
9As formally shown in Appendix A.2, this result can never apply whenever s (and r)
= 0. This is because, in such a case, a higher matching probability m only benefits shirkers,
hence unambiguously leads to a higher efficiency wage. Also note that while here we
concentrate on product market competition (highlighting the novel role it plays in affecting
wages), an analogous result would be obtained for other (not related to competition)
reasons which cause a sufficiently large difference between the job-finding rates of shirkers
with respect to non-shirkers.
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An increase in competition increases employment, thus leading to an in-
crease in the matching probability m. In turn, as discussed above in Lemma
1, the resulting effect on the equilibrium wage can be disentangled, by dis-
tinguishing between the “Shapiro-Stiglitz effect” and the “reputation effect”,
which operate against one another. However, besides increasing m, an in-
crease in n also produces another important effect, namely it increases θ.
That is, it reduces the role of the workers’ reputation. In turn, by lowering
the cost of shirking, this drives firms to pay a higher rent to motivate their
workers.10 Thus, we can conclude that, when n increseas, the equilibrium
wage actually decreases if (and only if): i) the “changing m effect” is negative
(which requires that competition is sufficiently low); and ii) the “changing θ
effect” is so small that the “changing m effect” prevails.
Finally, note that Result 1 also states that even if ∂α/∂n < 0, only
wages paid by infra-marginal firms decrease, while the total industry wage
bill increases. This is because the total wage reduction for infra-marginal
firms is always lower than the wage paid by the marginal firm.11
3.2.2 Discretionary bonuses
Let us now consider an incentive scheme that provides for a bonus payment
that is conditional on the worker’s choice regarding effort (e.g. Bull 1987;
MacLeod and Malcomson 1989). Generally, together with the bonus that rep-
resents the implicit part of the contract, the latter also provides for a fixed
salary, whose payment can be enforced by a court. Since in our framework
firms have all the bargaining power vis-a`-vis the workers, firms fix the salary
such that, given the equilibrium bonus, workers exactly receive their oppor-
10Overall, the effect of an increase of n on the equilibrium wage via increasing θ is
captured by the first term of (10), which is always positive. It is worth noting that (10)
also provides some intuitions on the possibility of testing Assumption 1 (θ′(n) > 0) by
means of wage (rent) data across sectors, suggesting that, when Assumption 1 applies,
wage rents should increase with n. Obviously, this needs to control for job-finding rates
across sectors as well as several other variables, which is a non-trivial issue. This is because
many factors, which are correlated with the degree of industrial concentration, can affect
wage rents for workers (e.g. the presence and the structure of unionization).
11In the working paper version (Meccheri and Fanti 2012), we provide some illustrations
based on simulation results, which confirm such outcomes. They are not reported here for
reasons of space.
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tunity cost. Hence, the salary equals the workers’ reservation utility, which is
normalized to zero, permitting us to concentrate, without loss of generality,
only on the bonus. In Appendix A.1, where further details regarding firms’
and workers’ strategies are provided, we show that the equilibrium bonus
chosen by firms is:
wB = v. (11)
Note that, unlike the efficiency wages case, with discretionary bonuses:
i) the wage does not depend on the number of firms competing in the prod-
uct market; and ii) firms can potentially motivate workers without providing
them with a rent (Malcomson 1999). Furthermore, θ, hence a worker’s rep-
utation, never plays a role in providing incentives. This is because, in the
equilibrium with bonuses, employed workers receive exactly the same utility
as unemployed workers.
However, firms must be able to credibly commit themselves to paying the
bonus, which requires the information about a firm’s misbehaviour flows, at
least to some extent, in the (labour) market. Labour unions, for instance,
can contribute by monitoring the employment relationships between a firm
and its workers, and by providing the workforce with valuable information
regarding the firm’s adherence to implicit contracts (Hogan 2001). In addi-
tion, firms themselves could have an interest in credibly fostering the trans-
mission of this information to the market since, by committing themselves
more strongly, they can offer a broader range of incentives (Kreps and Wilson
1982; Tirole 1996; Tadelis 1999).
We will consider a situation in which information on a firm’s misbehaviour
flows in the labour market at a per-period rate z < 1. Nevertheless, whenever
this occurs, a firm’s reneging is interpreted by the labour workforce as a whole
as evidence that a firm does not fulfil informal agreements with its workers,
meaning that no worker will be motivated to work for that firm in the future
(Doering and Piore 1971; Bewley 1999).12
12It could be argued that, since we have related θ (which captures how workers’ repu-
tations flow in the market) to the number of competing firms, this could also be done for
z. However, difficulties in external agents verifying whether a monopolist has promised to
pay a bonus or whether the latter was actually paid appear to be exactly the same as for
an individual firm in a more competitive setting. Furthermore, since we postulate that θ
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Under this assumption regarding a firm’s reputation, the following con-
dition, as derived in Appendix A.1, must be satisfied in order to make agree-
ments on bonuses self-enforceable:
pi ≥ rv
z
. (12)
Taking into account (8), the equilibrium value for the firm’s profit in
the product market game, and solving for n, we obtain a condition for the
number of firms competing in the product market, which must be satisfied
in a self-enforcing equilibrium with bonuses:
n ≤ n˜ ≡ a√
cv
(
r+z
z
) − 1. (13)
Result 2 An upper threshold exists for the number of firms competing in
the product market, over which discretionary bonuses are not sustainable as
a self-enforcing equilibrium.
Since a firm’s profits are decreasing in n, (13) establishes an upper con-
straint for competition in the product market, for which discretionary bonuses
are sustainable as a self-enforcing equilibrium. This upper constraint is re-
lated to both product market and labour market parameters. The higher
a and the lower c (i.e. the higher the scale or size of the product market),
the higher the upper constraint n. In addition, the lower the disutility of
effort v and the higher the frequency with which information regarding a
firm’s misbehaviour flows in the labour market z, the higher n. Note that
if z → 0 (i.e. a firm’s reputation mechanism does not work at all), the firm
would never gain anything by sticking to the agreement. Hence there is no
(positive) number of firms for which implicit self-enforcing contracts can be
established. Finally, for the usual reasons, n also negatively depends on the
discount rate r.
depends on n (which relates to the labour market demand), symmetry would imply that
z should depend on ` (which relates to the labour market supply) instead of n. However,
since we consider a situation with unemployed workers (` > n), ` does not play any im-
portant role in the analysis that follows, thus there is no loss of generality in considering
z as exogenously given instead of as a function of `.
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4 Informal incentive schemes, competition and
industry profits
In this section, we explore how competition in the product market affects
industry profits according to the incentive scheme firms use to motivate their
workers. By taking (8), (9) and (11) (as well as (13)) into account, we can
easily derive industry profits under the two alternative incentive schemes
such as, respectively:
∑
piEW = npiEW =
na2
(n+ 1)2c
− nvα (14)
∑
piB = npiB =
{
na2
(n+1)2c
− nv if n ≤ n˜
0 if n > n˜.
(15)
By differentiating (14) and (15), respectively, with respect to n (and
recalling from the proof of Result 1 that α+ n∂α
∂n
> 0; see Appendix A.3), it
is easy to show that:
∂ (
∑
piEW )
∂n
=
(1− n)a2
(n+ 1)3c
− v(α + n∂α
∂n
) < 0 (16)
∂ (
∑
piB)
∂n
|n≤n˜ = (1− n)a
2
(n+ 1)3c
− v < 0 (17)
and ∣∣∣∣∂ (∑ piEW )∂n
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣∂ (∑ piB)∂n |n≤n˜
∣∣∣∣ (18)
that is, as n increases, industry profits decrease more rapidly with efficiency
wages than with discretionary bonuses.
All the above outcomes suggest that, in general, profits are higher with
discretionary bonuses than with efficiency wages. However, as soon as the
number of competing firms exceeds n˜, discretionary bonuses become unsus-
tainable as a self-enforcing equilibrium. Figure 1 describes the behaviour of
industry profits, in relation to the number of firms competing in the market,
with alternative incentive schemes (blue dashed lines for efficiency wages and
red solid lines for discretionary bonuses). Note that, since profits are always
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decreasing in n with efficiency wages, it can be argued that an upper thresh-
old for n also exists under such an incentive scheme, which corresponds to
the value for which profits become zero.
Figure 1: Incentive schemes, competition and industry profits
In Case 1 in Figure 1, industry profits with efficiency wages are already
negative when n approaches n˜, that is, the upper bound for n with efficiency
wages is lower than n˜. By contrast, in Case 2, the upper bound for n with
efficiency wages is higher than with discretionary bonuses. The following
result defines the condition for which the latter case actually applies, as well
as its main implication.
Result 3 If the rate z, with which a firm’s reputation flows in the labour
market, is sufficiently low, the upper bound for n with efficiency wages is
higher than with discretionary bonuses. Hence, a range of competing firms
exists, over and above n˜, for which an equilibrium with firms’ positive profits
only exists with efficiency wages.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
In Appendix A.4 we show that for the critical threshold with efficiency
wages to be larger than n˜, the following condition must be satisfied:
z <
r
α˜− 1 (19)
where “ ˜ ” means that α is evaluated in n = n˜. This makes sense. An
equilibrium with positive (industry) profits can exist only under efficiency
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wages if (and only if), under such a scheme, profits are still positive when
n = n˜. Since
∑
piEW (rapidly) decreases in n, this can happen only if n˜ is
sufficiently low, which occurs if z is (relatively) low. Moreover, when firms
pay efficiency wages, profits decrease with α (the term related to the wage
rent). Hence, z should be relatively low with respect to a given threshold,
related negatively to α˜. Also note that (19) is always satisfied when z → 0.
This is because, in such case, discretionary bonuses cannot be made self-
enforcing. Instead, it is never satisfied for z → 1, because n˜ becomes too
high for the critical threshold with efficiency wages to be larger.13
5 Concluding comments
In this paper, the dynamic interaction between product market competition
and incentives against shirking was analyzed within a framework where work-
ers’ effort is observable, but is not verifiable by a third party (e.g. a court).
In addition, it was assumed that the probability of the unemployed getting
a job could depend on their employment histories and, more importantly,
that such a possibility was related to the degree of product market competi-
tion. Thus the effects of two well-known incentive schemes, namely, efficiency
wages and discretionary bonuses, were studied and compared.
In contrast with standard results, we found that efficiency wages paid by
a firm can decrease when competition increases. When firms adopt discre-
tionary bonuses on the other hand, wages are uncorrelated with competition
in the product market, but an upper threshold exists for the number of
competing firms, above which such contracts are not sustainable as a self-
enforcing equilibrium. In addition, although efficiency wages involve firms
paying a rent to motivate their workers while discretionary bonuses do not,
if the rate with which information about a firm’s cheating behaviour flows in
the labour market is relatively low, a range of competition exists, over and
above the critical threshold with bonuses, for which firms can make positive
profits by only paying efficiency wages.
Let us conclude with an outline of some empirical issues which can be re-
13In this regard, also note that the role of other parameters (particularly, of r) is not
clear-cut, since their changes can generate both direct and indirect effects (e.g. increasing
α and decreasing n˜ at the same time) which may act against one another.
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lated to the above results. Firstly, since in our context there is the possibility
that efficiency wages both increase and decrease when competition becomes
fiercer, our outcomes appear more in line (with respect to the standard re-
sult that predicts a clear-cut positive relationship between wages and em-
ployment/competition) with the mixed empirical evidence on the connection
between wages and product market competition. Likewise for discretionary
bonuses since, in our framework, they are uncorrelated with competition in
the product market.
In addition, although empirically enucleating the effect of competition on
wages via incentive schemes is complex, our analysis could provide a spring-
board for new testable hypotheses on incentive contracts. Given that we
found that the larger the size of the market, the larger the critical num-
ber of firms for which (in equilibrium) profits can be positive with bonuses,
we would expect that, for a given (sufficiently high) degree of competition,
the probability of observing the use of discretionary bonuses is higher, the
“larger” the size of the market (i.e. in markets with higher values of a and
lower values of c). Moreover, industry profits behaviour under alternative in-
centive schemes also seem to suggest that, ceteris paribus, we would observe
discretionary bonuses in industries with relatively low numbers of firms. On
the other hand, (provided that information regarding a firm’s misbehaviour
flows at a low rate) efficiency wages should emerge, in a time series analy-
sis, when competition becomes fiercer or, in a cross-sectional study, in other
industries characterized by a higher degree of competition.
Appendix
A.1 Derivation of equilibrium wages
Efficiency wages
Denoting with wEW the (efficiency) wage paid by the firm and recalling that
workers’ decisions regarding effort is perfectly observable for firms, hence
a shirker is always fired at the end of the period, the expected discounted
lifetime utilities for a shirker and for a non-shirker are given by, respectively:14
14In order to simplify the algebra, we assume that current payoffs of period t realize at
the end of the period, hence they must also be discounted. This, however, does not have
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ESEW =
wEW
1 + r
+
US
1 + r
⇔ ESEW =
wEW + U
S
1 + r
(A1)
ENSEW =
wEW − v
1 + r
+
(1− s)ENSEW
1 + r
+
sUNS
1 + r
⇔ ENSEW =
wEW − v + sUNS
r + s
.
(A2)
The worker will certainly shirk unless ENSEW ≥ ESEW . Substituting for US
and UNS from (4) in (A1) and (A2), respectively, rearranging and solving for
wEW , we get the following “no-shirking condition”for the worker:
wEW ≥ v
[
(m+ r)(1 + θm+ r)
m+ r − s(θm+ r)
]
(A3)
which, in equilibrium, holds with equality because profit-maximizing firms
pay the lowest wages consistent with (A3).
Discretionary bonuses
Since effort is perfectly observable, when firms adopt discretionary bonuses
to motivate workers, a shirker never receives the bonus payment and is always
fired at the end of the period. Hence, denoting the discretionary bonus with
wB, the expected discounted lifetime utilities of a shirker and a non-shirker
are, respectively:
ESB =
US
1 + r
(A4)
ENSB =
wB − v
1 + r
+
(1− s)ENSEW
1 + r
+
sUNS
1 + r
⇔ ENSB =
wB − v + sUNS
r + s
. (A5)
Clearly, workers will shirk unless ENSB ≥ ESB. Solving for the bonus, we
get the following incentive-compatibility condition for the worker:
wB ≥ v. (A6)
Firms choose the lowest bonus compatible with (A6), which, in equilib-
rium, holds with equality.
Firms, however, must be able to credibly commit themselves to paying the
bonus. Consider that workers play a trigger strategy. Thus, a (non-shirker)
any qualitative effect on the points that we make.
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worker not receiving a promised bonus will decide not to exert any effort
for the firm in the future. However, since the firm’s profit is negative when
workers shirk, it is always better for a firm to end the employment relation-
ship and look for another applicant than let the relationship continue with
no effort by the worker in the future. However, according to the hypothesis
regarding a firm’s reputation described in the main text, the possibility for
a “cheating” firm to get another worker occurs at the rate 1− z.
Hence, the expected discounted profits for a “cheating” firm and for a
“non-cheating” firm (that honestly pays the bonus) are, respectively:
ΠC =
pi + wB
1 + r
+
(1− z)ΠC
1 + r
⇔ ΠC = pi + wB
r + z
(A7)
ΠNC =
pi
1 + r
+
ΠNC
1 + r
⇔ ΠNC = pi
r
. (A8)
The firm cheats on the bonus payment unless ΠNC ≥ ΠC . Solving for pi,
we obtain the following “no-cheating” condition for the firm:
pi ≥ rwB
z
. (A9)
Finally, in order to define the aggregate condition that makes implicit
agreements with bonuses self-enforceable, we add (A6) to (A9) and, taking
into account that the firm makes the lowest payments, we get:
pi ≥ rv
z
. (A10)
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. By differentiating the efficiency wage wEW = vα with respect to m
yields:
∂wEW
∂m
= v
∂α
∂m
R 0⇔ ∂α
∂m
R 0 (A11)
where
∂α
∂m
=
θ(m+ r) [m+ r − s(θm+ r)]
[m+ r − s(θm+ r)]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Shapiro-Stiglitz effect (+)
−(1− θ)rs(1 + θm+ r)
[m+ r − s(θm+ r)]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
reputation effect (−)
. (A12)
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In particular, if n → ∞, ∂α/∂m > 0. Instead, if n = 1, we have that
∂α/∂m < 0. Moreover, noting from (A12) that ∂α/∂m is increasing in θ and
taking into account, from Assumption 1, that θ is increasing in n, there will
be a number of firms nm ∈ (1,∞) such that:
∂wEW
∂m
Q 0⇔ n Q nm. (A13)
A.3 Proof of Result 1
Proof. By differentiating the efficiency wage wEW = vα with respect to n
yields:
∂wEW
∂n
= v
∂α
∂n
R 0⇔ ∂α
∂n
R 0 (A14)
where:
∂α/∂n =
θ′(n)m(m+ r)(m+ r + s)
[m+ r − s(θm+ r)]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
θ′(n)
∂α
∂θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
changing θ effect
+
∂m
∂n
[
θ(m+ r) [m+ r − s(θm+ r)]
[m+ r − s(θm+ r)]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
standard Shapiro-Stiglitz effect
−(1− θ)rs(1 + θm+ r)
[m+ r − s(θm+ r)]2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
reputation effect︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂m
∂n
∂α
∂m︸ ︷︷ ︸
changing m effect
.
(A15)
First of all, notice that, since θ′(n) > 0, ∂α/∂θ > 0 and ∂m/∂n > 0, (A15
) can be negative only if ∂α/∂m < 0. As shown in Section A.2, this can apply
only if n is sufficiently low (n < nm). However, this is a necessary but not
sufficient condition. Indeed, to be ∂α/∂n < 0, the following condition (with
∂α/∂m < 0) also needs to be satisfied:
θ′(n)
∂α
∂θ
<
∣∣∣∣∂m∂n ∂α∂m
∣∣∣∣ . (A16)
To proof that the industry total wage bill,
∑
wEW , always increases with
n, recall that ∂ (
∑
wEW ) /∂n = v [α + n(∂α/∂n)], where vα is the wage paid
21
by the marginal firm, while nv(∂α/∂n) is the total variation of wages paid
by infra-marginal firms.
From (9) and (A15), we know that:
α+ n
∂α
∂n
=
(r +m)(1 + θm+ r)
m+ r − s(θm+ r) −
n(1− θ)∂m
∂n
rs(1 + θm+ r)
[m+ r − s(θm+ r)]2 + nΨ (A17)
where Ψ ≡ θ′(n)m(m+r)(m+r+s)
[m+r−s(θm+r)]2 +
θ ∂m
∂n
(m+r)
m+r−s(θm+r) > 0.
Using (5) and defining Ω ≡ ` − (1 − s)n > 0, the r.h.s. of (A17) can be
rewritten as:
1+θm+r
[m+r−s(θm+r)]2×[(
rΩ + sn
Ω
)(
rΩ(1− s) + sn(1− θs)
Ω
)
− n(1− θ)rs
2`
Ω2
]
+ nΨ (A18)
which, with some tedious algebra (details available on request), becomes:
1+θm+r
[m+r−s(θm+r)]2×{
rΩ [(rΩ + sn)(1− s) + sn[r(1− s)(`− n)]] + s2n2 [1 + θr(1− s)− θs]
Ω2
}
+nΨ > 0.
(A19)
A.3 Proof of Result 3
Proof. As discussed in the main text, an equilibrium with positive profits
only exists under efficiency wages if (and only if), under such a scheme, they
are positive for n = n˜. By substituting for (13) in (14), and defining with α˜
the corresponding wage rent term, we get:
∑
piEW |n=n˜ = n˜

a2[
a√
cv( r+zz )
]2
c
− vα˜)
 . (A20)
Using some algebra, (A20) becomes:
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∑
piEW |n=n˜ = n˜v
(
r + z
z
− α˜
)
(A21)
which is strictly positive for:
z <
r
α˜− 1 . (A22)
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